Book Review
Ideas Matter: A Review of John Denvir's
Democracy's Constitution
By MARK NEAL AARONSON*

IN

DEMOCRACY'S CONSTITUTION,' John Denvir's immediate objective is to reclaim the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as constitutional grounding for the development
of fundamental rights of American citizenship. 2 His intended audience is both professional and general. While he discusses a number of
United States Supreme Court cases to present his views, his focus is
not on how most persuasively to affect future judicial interpretations
or even conventional doctrinal scholarship. His aim is, instead, to resurrect the Privileges or Immunities Clause as an intellectual foundation for legislative and popular action in ways both consistent with
American political ideals and responsive to contemporary social reality. Having an impact on court doctrine is, at most, a secondary
3
concern.
Denvir's foray in this concisely written book reflects his commitment to the importance of ideas as a spur to action. He invites others
to respond to his positions, which he presents as laying the grcundwork for a continuing dialogue. It is in that spirit that I write this review. First, I critically summarize his argument on its own terms. Next,
I express some reservations that address several conceptual considerations he has not sufficiently explored as part of his analysis.
What is especially refreshing about this book is Denvir's conscious
engagement-both practical and theoretical, both passionate and intellectual-with real world lives and consequences. In this book, he is
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not interested in constitutional ideas for their own sake but rather
how they help give concrete expression to democratic political values
and social aspirations.
I.

Giving Content and Context to the Pursuit of Happiness

A.

Denvir's Constitutional Vision

In seeking a textual source for his vision of the American polity
and its aspirations, Denvir starts not with the Constitution of 1787 but
with the Declaration of Independence, specifically Jefferson's formulation of "the pursuit of Happiness" as a core American political
ideal. 4 It is the founders' ringing declaration of freedom, not their

second effort at structuring a nation state following the failures of the
Articles of Confederation, that atypically roots his constitutional
inquiry.
For Denvir, the 1787 Constitution with its acknowledgment of
slavery, and absent the Bill of Rights, which was not adopted until four
years later, is a stilted source of democratic values, particularly those
emphasizing individual rights. He also concludes that what he calls
the "first" Constitution provides little textual support for the extent
and range of governmental activities characteristic of a modern democratic state. 5 The one thin reed in the first Constitution that he identifies as supporting a potentially expansive role for government, and
not merely a set of negative restraints, is the Preamble's prescription
"to promote the general Welfare." 6
This phrase is, however, at best, a vague admonition. It calls attention to a fundamental purpose of government but is in itself insufficient, as Denvir himself describes, to provide constitutionally
prescribed direction for governmental action to redress social, economic and political inequities as they may exist. As he reads the text,
the 1787 Constitution establishes institutional arrangements for democratic representation and the rule of law but not much else. The
1787 Constitution offers little guidance for the contemporary world
on what is required of a government that is substantively responsive to
all its citizenry.
Denvir's step back to the Declaration of Independence as a
source for a constitutional vocabulary appropriate to the 21st century
has some real promise. His pointing to Jefferson's inclusion of the
4.
5.
6.

See id. at 9.
See id. at x.
Id. at 42-43.
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pursuit of happiness as an unalienable right along with life and liberty
rather than property is, in particular, potentially highly suggestive.
Unhappily, however, he neglects to develop a specific understanding
of the pursuit of happiness as a political ideal. He invokes the notion
several times, unlike his fleeting reference to the Preamble's general
welfare provision, but he never addresses its etymology and history to
see whether there is additional meaning to be mined in working out a
framework for American democratic citizenship. This is a critical oversight, as I discuss later in this review. Rather than exploring fully the
idea of happiness, Denvirjumps instead to the Declaration's premise
that "'all men are created equal,"' a conviction belied by the 1787
Constitution's acknowledgment of slavery. 7 It is the quest for the realization of equality in the pursuit of happiness that drives Denvir's constitutional inquiry and shapes his interpretation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.
In short, Denvir's first move in developing his argument is to
largely ignore the actual terms of the 1787 Constitution and hearken
back to the Declaration of Independence. From the Declaration, he
relies on revered ideas-the pursuit of happiness and the equality of
all-to establish a fundamental purpose, and to reinforce a critical,
underlying premise, regarding the exercise of governmental authority
under the Constitution. His principal thematic consideration is justifying an aggressive role for government in overcoming societal inequalities. Only after laying this introductory foundation does Denvir turn
to specific constitutional text.
This involves a second move, which constitutes the bulk of the
book. It entails a reinterpretation of what he calls the "second" Constitution, by which he means the political regime established by the postCivil War Amendments, especially the Fourteenth Amendment.8 His
argument principally focuses on the Privileges or Immunities Clause
but with important attention given to the Equal Protection Clause and
the First Amendment. While his interpretation of the post-Civil War
Amendments as representing a substantial break with the constitutional past is not novel, his use of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
is innovative. 9

7. See id. at 1 (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776)).
8. See id. at x.
9. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863 (1986).
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Interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause

Denvir begins conventionally with a refutation of the Slaughterhouse Cases.10 There, the United States Supreme Court early on eviscerated the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause by
holding that it protected only a narrow category of national rights specifically mentioned in the Constitution, such as the right to use the
navigable waters of the United States. t" The facts of the case involved
Louisiana legislation that limited where in New Orleans the slaughtering of animals legally could take place, the practical effects of which
were to give a monopoly to a single meat packing corporation and to
prevent other butchers from continuing to ply their trade locally. Doctrinally, the Court's majority opinion rejected interpretations that
brought within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges
or Immunities Clause either rights of state citizenship or rights of national citizenship not explicitly articulated in the Constitution. Decided just five years after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868, the Slaughterhouse decision in upholding the
Louisiana legislation spelled the death knell of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a source of new constitutional doctrine for most of
the next 125 years.
With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of individual rights since the Slaughterhouse Cases, judicial attention has focused instead on the scope and meaning of the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses. By contrast, the Privileges or Immunities
Clause has had scant legal or political impact, notwithstanding its position as the first of the three clauses in Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment circumscribing the authority of the states. Recently, however, the Supreme Court turned anew to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause in Saenz v. Roe. 12 In that 1999 case, the Court surprisingly relied on the Privileges or Immunities Clause to reject California's plan,
permissible under applicable federal legislation, to pay lower public
assistance benefits to recently arrived state citizens than those paid
13
others for whom California was their permanent place of residence.
10. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). Others cited by DENVIR, supra note 1, at 36 n.12, as sharing his
view that the case was wrongly decided include CHARLES BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM (1997); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 558-59 (Foundation Press

2d ed. 1988); and Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: 'Its Hour Come at
Last?'1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405 418-20 (1972).
11. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 79-80.
12. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
13. See id. at 507-09. Before Saenz, the only other case where the Court used the Privileges or Immunities Clause to invalidate state legislation was Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404
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Denvir references the Saenz decision in his introductory chapter
as indicative of a possible reconsideration by the Supreme Court of
the constitutional role of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 14 but he
uses the decision neither to develop his argument about its meaning
nor even to bolster significantly the intellectual timeliness of his own
inquiry. Although it is too soon to tell whether Saenz is an idiosyncratic
case or foreshadows a new development in constitutional jurisprudence, it does give credence to taking a fresh look at the Clause's
potential ambit.
Denvir's lack of attention to Saenz is in all likelihood the result of
his disagreement with its underlying theory regarding the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. In addition to rejecting the crabbed interpretation of national rights of citizenship found in the Slaughterhouse Cases,
15
he also finds unhelpful two other competing theories.
The first treats the Clause as requiring only equality of treatment,
specifically intra-state equality with respect to a state's non-discriminatory treatment of its own citizens. 16 It is this theory that the Supreme

Court employed in the Saenz opinion. The Court rejected California's
attempt to pay new residents less welfare than longer term residents
because it created a double standard based on length state of citizenship that had nothing to do with the need for benefits.' 7 What was
unusual was the Court's conclusion that this type of durational residential requirement was invalid because it violated the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.1 8
Thirty years earlier, the Court in Shapiro v. Thompson 9 had found
a similar welfare durational residency requirement, one which barred
the receipt of any public assistance benefits for newcomers to a state
for one year, on the ground that it constituted an impermissible state
(1935), which was overruled five years later by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940). The
issue in both cases involved the constitutionality of taxing state residents at a higher rate on
income earned out-of-state than that earned in-state. The reversal during the late New Deal
was part of the Court's general retreat from overruling economic legislation on substantive
due process grounds.
14. See DENVIR, supra note 1, at 6 n.4.
15. See id. at 6-7.
16. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385 (1992). Harrison is a strong proponent of this theory, the conceptual framing and
historical research in support of which he credits to DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 342-51 (1986). In developing his argument, Harrison presents a comprehensive and detailed summary of various contending
theories about the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
17. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505.
18. See id. at 502-04.
19. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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infringement of the right to travel under the Equal Protection Clause.
For Denvir, an anti-discriminatory, equal treatment reading of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause adds nothing to the kind of developments already spawned by application of the Equal Protection
Clause. 20 Indeed, one might speculate that the Court's use of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in Saenz is a potential step backwards in
that it is yet another judicial turn away from equal protection doctrine
as a source of rights protective of relatively weak constituencies.
The second theory of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which
Denvir rejects, is really a cluster of interpretations regarding a "substantive" reading of the Clause's terms. The disputes here involve various content-based theories. Like all scholars, Denvir acknowledges
that a major reason for enacting the Fourteenth Amendment was to
insure that Congress had the authority to pass the Civil Rights Act of
1866. Where he parts company with most content-based theorists is in
confining rights under the Privileges or Immunities Clause to those
specifically enumerated in any historical document including the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.21
In a brief discussion, Denvir readily concludes that the drafters of
the Fourteenth Amendment meant to protect constitutionally substantive rights specifically mentioned in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
such as the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue and give evidence in court, and to inherit, purchase and sell property. 22 What he
sidesteps is the debate over what that then means regarding the scope
and purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. These statutorily
referenced rights are generally the subject of state-developed laws.
Consequently, a major, underlying conceptual question is whether the
Privileges or Immunities Clause represents merely federal recognition
of rights already existent under state law, or the advent of new national rights subject to autonomous and superceding federal action. If
the former, the Privileges or Immunities Clause would add nothing
substantive to existing state law, and the equal treatment theory of the
20. See DENVIR, supra note 1, at 6.
21. See id. at 7-8. Denvir gets to his main points quickly. A number of prominent
competing and sometimes complicating theories regarding the Privileges or Immunities
Clause are rejected sub silencia.An example is the dissent in Adamson v. California,332 U.S.
46, 68-123 (1947), where in arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill
of RightsJustice Hugo Black described the Privileges or Immunities Clause as applying the
first eight amendments to the states and doing nothing else, a position also endorsed by
William W. Crosskey in POLITICS AND THE CONSITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1089-95 (1953), cited in Harrison, supra note 16, at 1394.
22. See DENVIR, supra note 1, at 7.
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Clause's meaning would gain additional plausibility. If the latter, the
constitutional stage would be set for the supplanting of state legislation and case law with national legislation and judge-made federal law
in all sorts of substantive fields still left to the states. This second prospect would constitute a sea change in the American federal system
given its potentially unsettling effects in such legal areas as contracts,
23
torts, property, and family law.
Like John Hart Ely, Denvir construes the phrase "privileges or
immunities" expansively as setting out an abstract idea. 24 He rejects
not only what he terms the "puny" conception of rights adopted in the
Slaughterhouse Cases but any similarly drawn, narrow categorization of
protected rights. 25 Denvir wants to explore what can be gleaned from
the Privileges or Immunities Clause regarding the development of
fundamental rights appropriate to the 21st century, whether through
judicial interpretation, legislative enactments, or a combination of
both. This book is not about the articulation and enforcement of already well-recognized legal rights. It is about effectuating a grand,
content-based theory of evolving rights of national citizenship.
Denvir draws his constitutional textual inspiration from two
sources: Justice Bushrod Washington's statement regarding fundamental rights in Corfield v. Coryell,26 an early decision interpreting the
meaning of "privileges and immunities" as used in Article IV of the
Constitution, and Justice William Brennan's interpretive posture re27
garding constitutional text.
For Denvir, the co-joining of the terms "privileges" and "immunities" in both Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment suggests a
common understanding. 28 Article IV is usually referred to as the Comity Clause, and it affords protections to citizens of American states who
are temporarily in other states.2 9 The Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is directed at the rights of citizens in
the states in which they permanently reside. 30 Given that Corfield was a
well-known case, Denvir has no reservations in subscribing to the
23.

See Harrison, supra note 16, at 1392.

SeeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980), cited in DENVIR, supra note 1,
at 7-8.
25. See DENVIR, supra note 1, at 6-7.
26. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
27. See William J. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
25 S. TEX. L. REv. 438 (1986).
28. See DENVIR, supra note 1, at 7.
29. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999).
30. See id. at 502-03.

24.
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framers of the Fourteenth Amendment Justice Washington's definition of privileges and immunities. 3 1 That definition is "those privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong of right, to citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all
times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union." 3 2 The key for Denvir is Justice Washington's emphasis on "fundamental."
There is some irony in Denvir's use of this famous legal definition. In Corfield, Justice Washington, sitting on circuit, rejected the
claim of the Delaware plaintiff, whose boat had been seized by New
Jersey because subleasees had used it to rake oysters in a part of Delaware Bay claimed by New Jersey. Justice Washington construed the
dispute as not involving a fundamental right, and thus a protected
privilege, but as state regulation of commonly owned property, that is,
oysters. The boat had been legally seized as a penalty, even though
NewJersey citizens were not subject to the same penalty.3 3 Neither the

right to fish in another state's waters nor ownership of a boat was a
fundamental interest. This conclusion, especially regarding the ability
to earn a living as a non-state resident, is directly at odds with Denvir's
view of the type of rights that most warrant protection under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Because he seeks to develop a progressive interpretation of the
Constitution, one which is responsive to changing social circumstances and the needs of a post-industrial urban society, Denvir not
surprising cites favorably Justice Brennan, who during the second half
of the 20th century was pivotal in the development of constitutional
doctrine that sought to address glaring social and political inequities.
He quotes Justice Brennan as follows:
[T]he ultimate question must be: What do the words in the text
mean in our time? For the genius of the Constitution rests not in
any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and
gone, but in the adaptability of its great
principles to cope with
current problems and current needs. 34
It is to this task, as set by Justice Brennan, that Denvir directs his attention in this book, not to provide the definitive word but to make a
provocative contribution.
From where then does Denvir get his specific ideas regarding the
substantive content of the Privileges or Immunities Clause? They do
31.
32.
33.
34.

See DENMR, supra note 1, at 7.
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (1823), cited in DENViR, supra note 1, at 7.
See id.
Brennan, supra note 27, at 438, quoted in DENVIR, supra note 1, at 8.
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not come from received case doctrine. Such doctrine is useful for him
only insofar as it underscores its own inadequacies and limitations.
Nor does he much rely or build on the views of other contemporary
scholars. Instead, his ideas are rooted in practical observations regarding what is needed to overcome the disjunctures between existing social, political and economic realities and the actualization of broad
and meaningful democratic participation.
Denvir's goal is to define and refine a core set of rights that can
be invoked both politically and legally, thereby facilitating opportunities for all individuals to develop fully their talents. At the end of the
book, he characterizes his vision as a program of "democratic individualism."35 The rights that he emphasizes call for affirmative governmental action, not governmental restraint. While his key
constitutional touchstone is the Privileges or Immunities Clause, his
project is the explication of certain positive rights fundamental to contemporary democratic citizenship, the realization of which depends
upon government initiative and support. Immunities or negative liberties that limit the extent and control the character of governmental
action are largely outside Denvir's purview. Unlike the framers of the
1787 Constitution who focused on the dangers of government, his
worries begin with inequities and imbalances within American societyat-large. The central issue for him is how to shape and enforce an
effective and responsible governmental role in the prevention and
curtailment of social injustices.
Though not offered as an exclusive list, Denvir regards four fundamental privileges as pivotal in the 21st century, if the promise of the
Declaration of Independence is to be realized. They are "the opportunity to earn a living, the right to a first-rate education, the right to a
voice that is heard, and the right to a vote that counts."3 6 The first two
he terms social rights; the latter two, political rights. He devotes a
chapter to each, explaining what it entails and why it is critical to
American democracy. These four chapters are bracketed by a chapter
where he discusses the shortcomings of existing Supreme Court doctrine in each area, and a chapter on the Equal Protection Clause,
which he views as serving a complementary purpose to the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. Before discussing specifically Denvir's four privileges, I address briefly his handling of the Equal Protection Clause.

35.
36.

DENVIR, supra note

Id at 8.

1, at 126 (emphasis omitted).
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An Equal Protection Clause Quandary

Since Denvir looks to the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a
new, pivotal constitutional source for basic rights of citizenship, he
finds that he has to reconfigure the jurisprudential role that was
played by the Equal Protection Clause for much of the 20th century.
Rather than seeking to accommodate a host of substantive issues
under equal protection doctrine, something which he considers a
conceptual stretch, he favors reserving the Equal Protection Clause to
its initial, historical purpose of remedying discriminatory treatment
against African Americans and, analogously, other minorities.3 7 With
respect to this role and contrary to the thrust of current Supreme
Court decisions, Denvir is a proponent of race-sensitive remedies. For
him the key question is "how to devise forms of affirmative action that
38
respect the rights of white citizens."
His own response here is tepid, declaring that affirmative action
always requires a contextual balancing of competing factors. While
specific factual circumstances are critical, ad hoc balancing is rarely
sufficient in itself. Some principled guidance is needed if there is to
be even a modicum of predictability. In this instance, the question
that Denvir poses raises a theoretical dilemma that requires conceptual consideration.
The quandary is this: A crucial feature of Denvir's interpretation
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is his incorporation of a master
principle of equality. What he hopes to accomplish through his specification of fundamental privileges is to provide an intellectual justification for the kind of affirmative and substantive governmental action
needed to help level an unequal social playing field. The overarching
function of the fundamental privileges is to foster realistic opportunities for all individuals to pursue happiness and thrive in ways that they
themselves define.3 9 In this formulation, Denvir does not posit that
there is one standard in implementing these privileges for whites and
another for people of color.
How, then, does one reconcile a white person's opportunity to
earn a living with an understanding of the Equal Protection Clause
that mandates affirmative action remedies for minorities who have historically been discriminated against? As Denvir has refashioned these
concepts, the two clauses, contrary to his intention, are not necessarily
37.
38.
39.

See id. at 109.
Id. at 124.
See id. at 126.
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functionally complementary for all people. One person's sense of
right still can be pitted against another person's claim of impermissible discrimination. If anything, the likely effect of constitutionalizing a
right to earn a living is to give added weight to arguments against
affirmative action remedies in employment and contracting. Thus,
while Denvir wants to preserve a place for the Equal Protection Clause
in the practical eradication of historical and institutional racism, it is
not at all clear that the logic of his commitment to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause allows him to do so consistently.
D.

The Opportunity to Earn a Living

From an historical and legal perspective, the opportunity to earn
a living, Denvir's first fundamental right, is the most problematic. He
sums up this best when he posits the following seemingly rhetorical
question: "Does the unemployment of millions of Americans raise an
issue of constitutional significance?" 40 If one were to ask ordinary citizens, a high proportion would probably answer yes. For them constitutional significance is likely to be understood as fundamental
importance. It is with that in mind that Denvir builds his case for the
recognition of the opportunity to earn a living as a fundamental right
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Yet if one were to ask the same question to American constitu41
tional scholars, the conventional answer, as Denvir points out, is no.
Constitutional law as interpreted by the courts provides no persuasive
support. The Slaughterhouse Cases and the holding in Corfield v. Coryell
are but two prominent examples. Moreover, the predominant view of
the Constitution as a whole is that it is, in Denvir's paraphrase, "a
charter of negative liberties that may sometimes protect citizens from
government action but never requires government to act affirmatively." 42 While Denvir argues against these interpretations, he finds
little in standard constitutional doctrine to support his position. He
therefore turns to Congress for support for his concerns.
Here, too, the record is slim. Denvir optimistically points to New
Deal programs, like the Public Works Administration. 43 He also subsumes under the right to earn a living an ancillary right to a sufficient
income for those who earn very little or are unable to work. With respect to government income subsidy programs, he cites the under40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 41.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 45.
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acknowledged Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which Congress enacted in 1990 and expanded in 1994.44 The EITC provides low-income
workers with tax credits that can result not only in reduced tax liability
but also a cash refund if the credit exceeds the actual tax liability. For
those who apply and qualify based on their earnings and family size,
the receipt of benefits is automatic.
Denvir neglects to mention, however, other Congressional initiatives that started ambitiously but have fallen far short of achieving
their initially intended objectives. For example, both the Employment
Act of 194645 and the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of
1978 (the "Humphrey-Hawkins Bill") 46 sought to make full employment a national reality. In each case, the final statutory language was
exhortatory, not binding, and ultimately ineffective. Neither enactment, though much trumpeted, had any significant impact on creating and guaranteeing job opportunities for all those willing and able
to work. 47 It is not at all obvious that the added symbolism of a constitutional right lessens in any meaningful' way the multitude of
problems, legislatively and practically, that can complicate and frustrate even the most concerted effort to provide for full employment.
Denvir also fails to acknowledge a recent, key setback in the legislative recognition of social rights generally. One of the most regressive
provisions in the welfare reform legislation enacted by Congress at the
behest of President Bill Clinton in 1996 explicitly declares that public
assistance benefits under the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
Program (TANF) are not statutory entitlements. 48 This provision ap44. See id at 47.
45. See Employment Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 304 (1946).
46. See Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-523, 92
Stat. 1887 (1978).
47. The course of the 1946 legislation began with directly promising full employment
but ended with watered down language that promised to equally promote "free competitive enterprise" and "maximum employment." Employment Act of 1946 § 2. The
Humphrey-Hawkins Bill set a legislative goal of three percent unemployment within five
years (15 U.S.C. § 1022a(b) (1)) but left its implementation to the discretion of the President to act administratively and seek further legislation as deemed appropriate. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1022a-1022d. See William P. Quigley, The Right to Work andEarn a Living Wage: A Propsed
ConstitutionalAmendment,2 N.Y. CiTy L. REV. 139, 153-161 (1998). Though the HumphreyHawkins Bill is still good law, I am aware of no arguments that link its enactment in a direct
way to the relatively low unemployment rates of the late 1990s, which appear to have been
mainly attributable to favorable market conditions and a lack of serious mistakes in governmental fiscal and monetary policy generally.
48. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, tit. I, § 103 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-603).
TANF is the successor welfare program to Aid to Families with Dependent Children
("AFDC"). States receive a federally funded block grant and have considerable program-
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pears to be an explicit attempt by Congress to undercut the continu49
ing, constitutional vitality of the landmark case of Goldberg v. Kelly,
which treated eligibility for public assistance as a statutory right and a
form of property entitled to the full procedural protection of the Due
Process Clause. Denvir relies on Goldberg to provide a glimmer of support for a constitutionally acknowledged right to earn a living because
it too invokes the institutionalization of a social right.50 At least so far,
rather than inspiring the kind of legislation Denvir wants to encourage, Goldberg has had the opposite effect. Congress has chosen
not to endorse but to curtail, even reverse, any recognition of welfare
benefits as legally enforceable social rights.
In industrial and post-industrial society, economic considerations
are especially dominant. For most of us, attachment to the work force
is both a financial necessity and a sign of one's worth socially and politically. Employment lies, as Judith Sklar argues and Denvir endorses,
at the very core of modern democratic citizenship. 51 The person who
does not work and is expected to work is socially and politically stigmatized. A persistent example is the negative stereotyping of welfare
recipients. Yet within American legal and political culture, the institutionalization of social rights, which can lessen such vulnerability, has
had an especially difficult course.
Denvir recognizes that he has an uphill battle. In the end, with
respect to the right to earn a living he offers only a hope: "Once
Americans as a political community take full-employment as a constitutional responsibility rather than merely a policy option, the dynamic
for reform should gain momentum." 52 What Denvir is expressing is a
faith in constitutional symbolism as a legislative catalyst. The history of
social welfare legislation during the last fifty years offers little support
for such optimism. No matter how one characterizes the underlying
interest, the political and economic obstacles to achieving and maintaining full employment permanently have been and remain
daunting.
matic discretion in providing time-limited, public assistance to needy families. The provision in question states the following: "No Individual Entitlement-This part shall not be
interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance under any State program
funded under this part." 42 U.S.C. § 601(b).
49. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
50. See DENVIR, supra note 1, at 43-44.
51. SeeJUDITH SKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 64 (1991),
quoted in DENVIR, supra note 1, at 33 ("[A] citizen is neither an aristocrat or a slave, but an
economically productive and independent agent.").
52. DENVIR, supra note 1, at 48.
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The Right to a First-Rate Education

The prospect for making constitutional headway regarding
Denvir's second fundamental privilege, the right to a first-rate education, is not as bleak. The right to an elementary and secondary education is already a statutorily recognized social right. All states are
required to provide a free public education for their youth. Although
the United States Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the
right to an elementary and secondary education constitutionally prohibits inequalities in public school funding, it came much closer to
endorsing a constitutional right to an education when it held that
public school districts have a duty to provide a free education even to
children of undocumented aliens. 53 Some state supreme courts, in interpreting their own constitutions, have gone even further in acknowl54
edging the fundamental importance of a right to an education.
The ultimate difficulty for Denvir, both constitutionally and as a
matter of legislative policy, is not the notion of a right to an education
but his emphasis on a "first-rate" education. The problems that he
foresees are threefold: Establishing appropriate funding levels for
schools in different communities; reaching agreements about what
constitutes a first-rate education; and insuring fair access to educational programs.
As to the first, Denvir favors a standard that would "provide equal
funding to each child's education unless an inequality in expenditure
can be justified on educational grounds." 5 While this kind of standard can deal with gross disparities in funding and the need for supplemental funds for hard-to-teach students, it does not guarantee an
appropriate level of funding. It also does not prevent private fund raising for public schools, which has the effect of reintroducing significant disparities in educational opportunities. The effectiveness of such
fund raising usually depends on the relatively high economic status of
a district's or school's parent body.
Denvir's discussion of the content of a first-rate education mainly
consists of short examples of what he has observed or regards as good
education. However, he avoids addressing whether a standard such as
"first-rate" is reasonably enforceable. The tortured history of federally
mandated, special education programs for children with disabilities
strongly suggests that it is not. There the applicable term of art is a
53. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
54. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
55. DENVIR, supra note 1, at 59.
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"free appropriate public education. ' 56 A combination of reasons, including insufficient funding, deficient knowledge about different disabilities and their treatment, lack of trained personnel, and general
administrative ineptness, has meant that the implementation of such
programs has fallen far short of legislative expectations. Court monitoring of appeals from administrative decisions has not been effective
or consistent. In particular, there is no substantive agreement over
what "appropriate" means other than that the education provided
need not be the best. 57 The result is ad hoc administrative and judicial

decision making, often at its worst, about what constitutes an appropriate education. The concept of "first-rate" would is even more
elusive.
Denvir's last problem pertains to access to higher education,
where he focuses upon admissions policies. While not opposed to neutral admissions policies, he calls for their careful structuring and monitoring so as to prevent exclusionary effects based on race or class.
Recognizing the grave disparities that now exist in our public education system, he also supports "bridge"58 programs to help prepare students from disadvantaged backgrounds to compete successfully at the
college level.
In conceptualizing his understanding of a right to education,
Denvir adds the idea of "first-rate" to give a qualititative and substantive cast to both its formulation and implementation. He adopts a similar approach with respect to his other two fundamental privileges-a
voice that's heard, and a vote that counts. In the educational arena,
the result is a discussion principally directed at a slew of public policy
concerns. It is not obvious what is to be gained by framing most of
these concerns as constitutional matters.
Constitutional understandings are much less subject to change
than legislatively enacted policies. Moreover, the requirements for a
quality education are not settled and not free from unpredictable,
even counter-productive interpretations and applications. Acknowledging constitutionally a generalized right to an education may not be
sufficient on its own to promote quality equal educational opportuni56. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (2000).
57. The leading United States Supreme Court case is Board of Education v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176 (1982). The Court construed the legislation minimally as providing only a
basic floor of educational opportunities, thereby leaving its implementation in individual
cases to the relatively unfettered discretion of the states and local school districts. See id. at
199-202.
58. See DENvIR, supra note 1, at 70.
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ties. It certainly has not been in California. 59 But including the notion

of "first-rate" as part of a constitutional standard is not likely to change
things much and potentially may do more harm than good. Under
either framing, the practical problems of educational funding and
school performance are no different. The additional risk is that
Denvir's aspirational modifier winds up being interpreted narrowly
and rigidly in ways that foreclose legislative initiatives.
When courts have the final word, as under our regime ofjudicial
review, constitutional doctrine has a tendency to develop an analytic
life of its own. Indeed, a major premise of Denvir's book is that the
judiciary has not been constitutionally responsive to changing social
needs and circumstances. Why, then, risk giving the United States Supreme Court the final say on what it means to provide a "first-rate"
education? The adoption of a right to an education as a federal constitutional right is an ambitious enough goal. Struggles over what policies and practices constitute a first-rate education are best left to
legislation, notwithstanding myriad disappointments past and present. If "first-rate" is a statutory standard, Congress and state legislatures retain the authority to reverse a poor judicial decision.
Though providing Americans with a "first-rate" education is a
worthy policy goal, its conceptualization as a constitutional standard is
likely to be far more troublesome than helpful. Unfortunately,
Denvir's analysis too quickly glosses over the institutional consequences of what he proposes. Our system of government is complicated. Shifting responsibilities from one branch to another and from
one level of government to another has potential costs as well as benefits. There is sound reason in our legal tradition for distinguishing
what is good policy from what is constitutionally required.
F.

Promoting a Voice and a Vote That Matters

In putting forth his analysis of the conditions necessary for meaningful democratic citizenship, Denvir appreciates that he has something of a chicken-and-egg problem. His main agenda is to promote
the constitutionalization of a strong concept of social rights. His pur59. The results of the 2001 Base Academic Performance Index for California public
schools indicate that only twenty-one percent of elementary schools, fifteen percent of
middle schools, and five percent of high schools met the targeted baseline numeric index
for student standardized testing performance (800 on a scale of 200 to 1000). See California
Department of Education News Release, REL #02-03 (January 16, 2002). Student standardized test results offer a comparative profile of school performance but are neither comprehensive nor uncontroversial measures of educational quality.
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pose is to forge a culturally acceptable, ideological handle to help
counter the effects of the unequal distribution of resources and various other structural imbalances and inequities within society-at-large.
Because constitutional rights are due greater deference than statutory
rights, there is important symbolic value and considerable potential
practical value in what Denvir proposes. Nonetheless, social rights
under either characterization are not self-executing. They invariably
require the enactment and administration of fairly substantial governmental programs. What those programs are depends on who participates politically.
For Denvir, needed educational and social welfare reforms are
unlikely to occur without accompanying political reforms affecting
both rights of free speech and the structuring of the right to vote. If
voices and votes are to be effective, the opportunities for participation
have to be real and not skewed to favor some classes and groups over
others. To avoid deciding which comes first, he characterizes the two
types of rights as synergistic: "[H]aving full political rights increases
the likelihood of gaining legislation that implements social rights; and
a realistic possibility of enacting social legislation provides the incentive for the broad political participation necessary for legislative success." 60 With this in mind, he discusses as fundamental privileges of
citizenship measures that he concludes must be taken to level the political as well as social playing field.
Denvir disavows any intention to provide a comprehensive theory
of free speech and concentrates instead on two issues. The first concerns the speech rights of citizens in a public forum or public place,
such as a street, a sidewalk or a park. His main worry concerns governmental regulations that prevent poor people from effectively speaking
and being heard. 61 The second issue pertains to campaign finance
reform. Here his concern is that the voices of the rich are heard too
much. 62
With respect to both these issues, he abandons any reliance on
the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a source of new constitutional
developments and directly focuses his discussion on First Amendment
doctrine itself. He links the two constitutional provisions only in an
early aside that the Supreme Court's incorporation of free speech
safeguards applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment
could have been accomplished more appropriately under the Privi60.
61.
62.

supra note 1, at 73.
See id at 74.
See id.
DENVIR,

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

leges or Immunities Clause than as a liberty protected by the Due Pro63
cess Clause.
Denvir's dissatisfaction with current First Amendment doctrine is
principally directed at facially neutral rules and tests that ignore social
and political reality. He rejects, for example, distinctions based on
whether the government has suppressed speech for good or bad motives. He is especially troubled by a case like Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 64 where the Supreme Court upheld the National
Park Service's refusal to permit a temporary "tent city" to be set up in
Lafayette Park across from the White House. The permit applicants
wanted to dramatize the plight of the homeless by having demonstrators sleep in the tents overnight. The Park Service denied the permit
on the ground that sleeping would constitute "camping" in violation
of park regulations, and maintained that there was no intention to
suppress the protestors' message. As the regulation prohibiting camping in an urban park was content neutral, the Court accepted the Park
Service's explanation and, in doing so, disregarded the regulation's
impact on the group's ability to attract public attention and raise public consciousness. There was no meaningful attempt to determine
whether the protestors' preferred method for advancing their political agenda could be reasonably accommodated.
Similarly, in the area of campaign finance reform, Denvir
strongly criticizes the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 65

which upheld congressionally enacted contribution limitations, but
overturned on First Amendment grounds legislative limits on campaign expenditures. He finds the distinction between permissible contribution limits and impermissible expenditure limits unworkable in
practice, as there is always a way around contribution limits. 66 The real
problem is the amount of money needed to buy television time and to
mount sophisticated campaigns. The high cost of campaigning favors
independently wealthy candidates and candidates who are able to attract wealthy supporters, often because of the positions the candidate
takes. Rather than count on the courts, Denvir looks to Congress for a
long term solution. To weaken the impact of monied interests on the
political process, his preference is the public financing of elections. 67
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id. at 10.
468 U.S. 288 (1984).
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
See DENVIR, supra note 1, at 84.

67.

See id at 88
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Any campaign finance reform legislation is, of course, a potential target for judicial challenge.
What especially raises Denvir's ire about the Buckley decision is
"its cavalier dismissal of the [challenged] statute's goal of furthering
political equality between citizens.

'6 8

He quotes the Court's majority

opinion as follows:
It is argued, however, that the ancillary governmental interest in
equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections serves to justify [this expenditure
limitation]. But the concept that the government may restrict the
speech of some elements in our society in order to enhance the
relative voice69 of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment."

For Denvir, the Court's position turns the First Amendment on its
head.
The purpose of the First Amendment is to advance the free
speech rights of all. In supporting the status quo, the Court's opinion
discounts the effects of social and economic imbalances on the exercise of such rights. Though presented as neutral in theory, the Court's
reasoning serves only to solidify the ability of the rich to influence
disproportionately public discussion and decision making. In Denvir's
view, this preclusion by the Court of legislative intervention to rectify
glaring inequalities in the opportunities for all citizens to participate
as equals in their governance is perverse. The Buckley decision is for
7°
him "the low point in modern American constitutional law." 1
Denvir is not an absolutist about the First Amendment. He accepts the necessity for reasonable free speech regulations, whether judicially or legislatively developed. What he does insist upon is a strong
presumption in favor of maximizing speech opportunities and careful
consideration of practical consequences. 7 1 Denvir's constitutionalism
is result-oriented. With respect to political speech, his mission is to
identify distortions in democratic participation based on wealth. His
aim is to encourage meaningful political opportunities, on terms of
relative parity, for all to be heard regardless of class.
Denvir approaches the right to vote in a similar fashion. He addresses structural biases that affect whether someone's vote really matters. The chief culprit for him is the gerrymandering of legislative
68.

Id. at 85.

69.
70.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49, quoted in DENVIR, supra note "l, at 85-86.
DENVIR, supra note 1, at 86.

71.

See id. at 80.
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districts. 72 Redistricting is an intensely political process. The results
most frequently produce electoral districts that protect incumbents
and favor candidates from one particular party. Another issue that
recurringly arises and has been the subject of significant legislation
and constitutional review by the courts is the impact of redistricting
on voting by members of minority groups. 73 The main concerns have
been whether a particular redistricting plan, on the one hand, has the
effect of diluting minority representation or, on the other, impermissibly takes race into account.
Denvir's solution lies outside the conventional legislative and
constitutional debate. He argues for a system of proportional representation, which he considers a constitutionally permissible option for
the selection of members of the House of Representatives and state
legislatures.74 Rather than running in a specific geographical district,
candidates would be part of a statewide party slate. After an election,
the state delegation in the House of Representatives and the makeup
of a state legislature would be determined by the percentage of statewide votes received by a particular party. Denvir anticipates that proportional representation would dramatically change the American two
party system and would lead to an increase in third party representation. 75 To limit a profusion of splinter parties in a legislative body, he
proposes that a party would have to receive a certain percentage of
the total to qualify for a legislative seat. 76 To account for local representation, he suggests that an alternative would be a mixed system
where some legislative members would be selected proportionately
and some from geographical districts. 7 7
Denvir supports a system of proportional representation because
he thinks it is more likely than our current electoral system to lead to
the reforms he wants in employment and education. 78 He fails to provide, however, any empirical evidence or even much of a logical argument in support of his position. Instead, he offers an assertion:
Proportional representation "commands my support for the simple

72.
73.

See id. at 92.
See Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55

(1980).
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See DENVIR, supra note 1, at 104-107.
See id. at 104-05.
See id. at 106.
See id.
See id.
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reason that it is more democratic." 79 This bald statement brings to the
fore a fundamental weakness in Denvir's overall approach.
In this short book, Denvir tries to do too much. He wants to establish a constitutional basis for social rights in the United States, and
he wants their legislative embodiment and implementation to be fully
responsive to the needs of most Americans. What most perplexes him
is that his agenda is unlikely to be accomplished without significant
political reforms. While he may be correct in underscoring this connection, his presentation is too shrift on too many issues.
Though not used in the United States, proportional representation is not a new idea. If Denvir wants to present a serious argument in
support of its adoption here, he must confront such issues as how this
type of system would work as part of a non-parliamentary form of government; what accounts for the persistence of a two-party system in
the United States and what would be lost if it were to be replaced; and
what needs to be done to avoid legislative paralysis if there were to be
significant multi-party representation in American legislatures. Furthermore, it is not obvious that a system of proportional representation would accomplish what he wants. Social rights are a much more
integral part of the European than American political fabric.80 Why
this is so is discussed briefly in the next section of this review. It is
unlikely, however, that given the variety of European governments
past and present, the answer has much to do with the representative
structure of democratic institutions in Europe, as compared to here.
The reasons reflect instead deep differences in political and cultural
history, particularly in the late 18th and throughout the 19th centuries.81 To make his case for proportional representation, Denvir has to
be much more of a political scientist and historian than he intends
here. An argument that ends with a mere assertion of belief does not
go far enough.
My concern is that in addressing structural biases in the American
political system, whether they involve voting or speech activities,
Denvir has abandoned the main theme of his book, which is to give
meaning to the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a constitutional
79.
80.

Id. at 107.

See MAURICE

MODERN SOCIETY

ROCHE, RETHINKING CITIZENSHIP: WELFARE, IDEOLOGY AND CHANGE IN

77-80 (Polity Press 1992).

81. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION, ch. 1 (Viking Press 1965). The main cataclysmic event for Europe was the French Revolution-a social revolution where class issues
were dominant. The American Revolution, which marks our country's beginning, was a
uniquely political revolution where the preoccupation was the establishment of a new form
of government, and where class (but not race) issues were relatively insignificant.
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touchstone for the development of social rights. Neither his chapter
on free speech nor his chapter on voting invokes the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Instead, he criticizes several Supreme Court decisions involving political speech under the First Amendment, and voting rights as developed pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause. He
then proposes some alternative legislative solutions, namely the public
financing of elections and proportional representation. These are
meaty topics in their own right. While free speech and voting are, in a
generic sense, privileges of American citizenship, Denvir's discussion
of these issues in this book is tangential to his central and most provocative insight, that is, his effort to transform the Privileges or Immunities Clause into a source of social democratic, constitutional thought
for the 21st century.
Whatever the need for accompanying political reform to make
social rights a reality, one does not have to turn to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as a constitutional wellspring. At this juncture,
though one may disagree with specific court decisions and legislative
policy choices, the body of constitutional law regarding speech and
voting is mature. There are worthy First Amendment and Equal Protection traditions upon which to build and which Denvir himself uses
and can continue to use in support of proposals for change. Both the
origins of his analysis and his proposed solutions regarding political
rights are very different from what is at issue in an analysis of social
rights in the United States.
With respect to the development of social rights, much more has
to be said both to set the terms of debate and to make a persuasive
argument. Denvir expresses his policy preferences, but he has not
anchored his thoughts. He rejects existing court doctrine and has little interest in narrow scholarly discussions regarding the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Given his interest in reaching a general, not just
professional audience, those are understandable choices. Nonetheless, having chosen not to do a tight legal analysis, Denvir still has to
find an ideological foothold that resonates broadly. Rather than having detoured to a discussion of specific political rights, he would have
better served his practical objectives had he retained his initial focus,
and explored more fully support for and resistance to the idea of social rights in American legal and political culture generally. Ideas that
make a difference practically must be culturally grounded. Denvir
points us in a certain direction but does not provide a sufficient, overarching, historical and political analysis. As a result, one's confidence
about the prospects for the meaningful recognition of social rights in
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the United States is no greater at the end of the book than it is at the
beginning.
II.

Social Rights: An American Constitutional and Cultural
Dilemma

In putting forth his argument in support of social rights, Denvir
underestimates the power of the intellectual currents against which he
has chosen to swim. Few Americans probably disagree with his basic
objectives regarding employment and education. Who wants to argue
against having everyone employed who wants to be employed or having every child receive a "first-rate" education? The difficulty is in persuading others regarding the means to achieving these objectives.
Conflicts arise because individuals disagree over their perception of
costs, not just in financial terms, but in terms of the values and ideas
they hold most dear. The realization of important human objectives
involves tradeoffs. Decisions have to be made about what takes
priority.
Denvir employs the notion of social rights so as to heighten the
deference given in public deliberation and enforcement to the kind
of policies that he finds have not been given sufficient due, if all indi82
viduals are to have an equal opportunity to thrive in our society. To

get us on the path he wants to take, he has to show us how it might
be done. There is a double dilemma here: Not only is there little in
our constitutional tradition that supports the idea of social rights as
constitutional, there is also little in our political culture in support of
the idea of social rights.
In my view, Denvir missteps in making his case for social rights in
two ways. First, he has not sufficiently accounted for the reasons for
the relatively undeveloped state of social rights in the United States.
Here, he might have taken into account the recent course of analyses
regarding the concept of "social citizenship" and the idea of "civil society." Second, as I noted at the beginning of this essay, he does not
independently examine the constitutional roots for the pursuit of happiness as a political ideal. Such an inquiry might have given collateral
support to his effort to read social rights into the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In this review, I only illustrate briefly what topics might
be covered in this kind of expanded approach. While not providing
82. Bill Simon, who has written extensively on welfare rights, perceptively notes: "Appeals to right occur only when activities and goals conflict; their function is to determine
whose side the state will take." See William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare
Rights, 44 MD. L. Rv.1,29 (1985).
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solutions in themselves, such inquiries place more fully in perspective
what needs to be overcome and what cultural resources may exist for
ideas, such as the ones Denvir proposes, to take realistic hold.
A.

Social Citizenship and Civil Society

The concept of social citizenship focuses on the social welfare of
individuals as a condition for democratic participation and the importance not only of rights, but also duties, as defining characteristics of
the relationship of the individual to society-at-large and the state.
Maurice Roche puts it this way: "'Social citizenship' refers to those
rights and duties of citizenship concerned with the welfare of people
as citizens, taking 'welfare' in a broad sense to include such things as
work, education, health, and quality of life."' 83 Denvir's interest in

guaranteeing an opportunity to earn a living and a right to a "firstrate" education falls squarely within the intellectual discourse over social citizenship. This discourse has, however, both a progressive and a
conservative cast.
On the progressive side, the ideas largely flow from the thought
of the post-World War II British sociologist, T. H. Marshall, and his
classification of rights as civil, political, and social rights. 84 Civil rights

are those rights that acknowledge what interests or activities have a
protected status within the society and economy and for whom they
have protected status. They include such substantive rights as a right
to own property, a right of privacy, as well as various procedural safeguards that limit how and when the state may take action against an
individual. Transplanted to our constitutional vocabulary, civil rights
in Marshall's framework include what we tend to consider conceptually as aspects of due process of law, substantively and procedurally.
Alternatively, they include what is referenced under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as immunities of citizenship-the negative liberties
that set constraints on government. Political rights pertain to the creation of opportunities for participation in public affairs, for example,
the right to vote and to hold public office. These rights also include
the political speech guarantees encompassed by the First Amendment. In other words, political rights delineate the extent to which
government processes are open to the claims and aspirations of different individuals. Social rights address issues of social equity and economic security. In contrast to civil rights, which seek to curb the
83. ROCHE, supra note 80, at 3.
84. See CLASS, CITIZENSHIP, AND $OCIAL
(1965).

DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS By T.

H. MARSHALL 78-81
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arbitrariness of governmental actions, and political rights, which define accessibility to governmental processes, social rights aim to provide measures of insurance against societal and economic
uncertainties.
Rights are not self executing. Their invocation requires individuals to do something. If someone owns real property and abandons it,
another individual may lay claim to its ownership after a certain period of time by adverse possession. All adult citizens have a right to
vote, but it is not effective unless exercised. While the notion of rights
carries great symbolic importance, the practical realization of a specific right entails corresponding duties either to lay claim to the right
or to avoid its loss.
A key distinction between civil rights and political rights, on the
one hand, and social rights, on the other, is that with respect to the
latter the corresponding duties tend to involve explicit state coercion.
The government not only offers assistance but also compels compliance or conformity. The clearest example is the right to an elementary or secondary school education. Both parents and children are
subject to sanctions if a child does not attend school. Thus, there is
not only a right to an education but also an enforceable duty to participate in an educational program.
Whereas the exercise of civil rights and political rights primarily
depends on individual initiative, social rights require as a precondition costly and complex governmental programs. There is, therefore,
a tendency of social rights to broaden both benefits and obligations of
the citizenry.8 5 When government directly provides a benefit, the legislature almost invariably enacts and effects some kind of quid pro
quo.86
Responding to the mid-20th century development of the social
welfare state in Great Britain and Western Europe, Marshall viewed
the institutionalization of social rights as largely accomplished and as
an important step in the evolution of modern democratic citizenship.
For him the notion of social citizenship embraced a strong concept of
social rights. However, it was one rooted in "the superstructure of le85. See REINHARD BENDIX, NATION-BUILDING AND CITIZENSHIP 107 (1969).
86. This is true not only in the provision of elementary and secondary education, but
for social welfare programs generally. American public relief programs routinely require
low-income beneficiaries to comply with a variety of program conditions, ranging from
monthly reporting of personal information to stringent requirements regarding seeking
and retaining employment. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, tit. I, § 103 (1993) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-603).
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gitimate expectations" of the citizenry, not the specific legal enforceability of those rights. 8 7 Marshall counted on broad cultural support

for social welfare programs as universal entitlements to sustain their
integrity as instruments for democratic citizenship and to check unreasonable governmental encroachments on individual autonomy.
While not denying the tendency of social rights to expand the duties
expected of individuals, he believed that such duties would not become overly burdensome and onerous. His confidence derived from
his sense of the evolutionary nature of individual rights in modern
British and Western European societies. The democratic expansion of
civil and political rights in these societies had involved substantial internal social upheaval in the 18th and 19th centuries and had been
directly imperiled by Naziism and fascism in the 20th century. From
Marshall's sociological standpoint, the hard-won and deeply felt sense
of entitlement of the citizenry for the whole panopoly of rights, including social rights, would curb the potential for abusive state
authority.
Though sharing much, the American political cultural experience is, as I have noted previously, significantly different from the European experience. The main epiphenomenon is the relative absence
of class consciousness as a political factor. Although America went
through the violent divisiveness of the Civil War in the 19th century,
like the American Revolutionary War, it too was largely a political
struggle, in this instance, between those favoring national institutions
of government and those seeking to preserve regional autonomy.
Most importantly, the cultural horror of slavery that led to the Civil
War was a racial, not class phenomenon. Class differences exist and
matter in the United States, but it is the persistence of racial
prejudice, not unfairnesses resulting from class distinctions, that most
tries the American political soul. In America, where almost all people
consider themselves middle class, we have not had the level of cohesive, mass working class support that occurred in Britain and Europe
to initiate and sustain a broad institutionalization of social rights politically and legally.8 8 One of the consequences of American exceptionalism in this regard is the absence of a viable, progressive concept of
89
social citizenship.
87. CLASS, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 84, at 114.
88. See FRANCES Fox VIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE, 424-27 (1993).
89. See Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, Contract Versus Charity: Why Is There No Social
Citizenship in the United States, 22 SOCIALIST REV. 45 (1992).
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To the extent there is in the United States a culturally rooted
concept of social citizenship, with notable support, it is a neo-conservative version that emphasizes social duties. 90 This version stresses
personal responsibility, duties of accountability, and social obligations. 9 1 Such neo-conservatism also reflects the strong individualism
strain in American political thought. C. B. Macpherson describes this
strain of individualism as having a "possessive quality," by which he
means that an individual is seen "as essentially the proprietor of his
own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them."9 2 Individuals, in short, are seen as primarily responsible for their own fates.
The result is that insufficient attention is given in social policy discussions and public debate on how the structural conditions of a society
and its dominant preferences affect who has opportunities to achieve
personal and social success. Instead, there are strong predilections to
blame the individual and to distrust government as a counter-balancing force capable of addressing prudently inequities within the society
and the economy. The mainstream in the American political tradition, now as well as in the past, has been largely blind to "the fact that
93
society, just as much as politics, might be a source of evil."

In raising the promise of social rights and an implicit progressive
concept of social citizenship, Denvir needs to come to grips with the
complicated context and set of relationships that mark divisions between public responsibilities assumed by government and responsibilities left to the operation of private forces in society-at-large. How these
divisions of responsibility are shaped and how the responsibilities
themselves are carried out are culturally specific. This does not mean
that there are not patterns of development and programmatic models
to be considered and, potentially, replicated. It does mean that one
has to pay very careful attention to the specific legal, political, and
societal context.
90.

See ROCHE, supra note 80, at 79-80. In contemporary America, it is hard to distin-

guish between neo-conservatives and neo-liberals since the orienting ideas of both are
rooted in nineteenth century classical liberalism and a deep skepticism about the value and
necessity of governmental social and economic intervention.
91. The writings of the American social welfare critic Lawrence Mead are a good example. He emphasizes such social obligations as working in whatever jobs are available;
fluency and literacy in English, whatever one's native tongue; learning enough in school to
be employable; and "law-abidingness." For Mead these are important informal duties of

citizenship because "Americans seem to regard them as mandatory." LAWRENCE MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 246 (1986), quoted in ROCHE,

supra note 80, at 80.
92.

C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 3

93.

Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 107 (1955).

(1964).
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In the United States, especially now, we have great faith in the
generative effects of private markets as catalysts for economic prosperity and social progress, and we are suspicious of centralized governmental planning. We still cede a lot to the private sector that
elsewhere in the developed world has become largely a public responsibility. Two ready examples are the lack of universal health care and
child care. Our obsession with private markets and our distrust of government also has tended to enhance the power of wealthy economic
interests both in areas left to private initiative and in the development
and implementation of public policies. Our republican form of government is responsive to the citizenry broadly, but most often in proportion to the influence wielded by the best organized and usually the
wealthiest interests, while our political leadership, for the most part,
rather than taking the initiative to propose and educate the citizenry
about potentially creative solutions, tracks popular polling and fash94
ions political rhetoric accordingly.
This political reality is, of course, a premise of Denvir's book and
he wants to alter our political assumptions. It would have been helpful
in showing us how to get from where we are to where he aspires to go
if he had examined the recent literature on civil society.9 5 While the
idea of civil society does not have a fixed meaning over time, 96 it is a
useful theoretical construct for examining the multi-dimensional relationships of private and public spheres of activities because it helps to
highlight in a systematic fashion the ideas behind and the institutional
consequences of the public-private boundaries that have been drawn
in a particular political culture. These are the boundaries that Denvir
seeks to reorder in proposing his reconceptualization of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause as a constitutional source for social rights.
In my discussion of social citizenship, I have indicated some of
the reasons why social rights have not engendered the same level of
popular acceptance in the United States as in other Western democracies. Implicit in what I have said are the beginning strands of a critique of the long-standing American theory of civil society. That
theory, which largely relies on the language of Madison 9 7 and de Toc94. An example is the appeal of cutting taxes and avoiding new taxes, positions recurrently advocated without any thoughtful acknowledgement of the impact upon the availability and quality of public services.

95.

SeeJOHN EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1999);

L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1994).
96. See EHRENBERG, supra note 95, at xi.
97. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10 (JAMES MADISON) AND 51 (JAMES MADISON or ALEXAN-
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queville,9 8 emphasizes the functional importance of intermediate,
often voluntary, associations in insuring liberty and limiting the tyrannical power of political institutions.99 More than I have done here,
Denvir's book needs to have provided an explanation for why that
idea of civil society (both in conception and in practice) either fails to
advance, or can be practically modified, to meet his expectations for a
constitutional democracy. Without such an analysis, his proposals for
constitutional innovation and political reforms are left hanging untethered to any structural dynamic for social change.
The pivotal problem is that a redefinition of constitutional rights
is rarely enduring without significant societal impetus and cultural
resonance outside the legal order. A good example of this is the case
of Goldberg v. Kelly cited by Denvir as support for a constitutional right
to earn a living. Earlier, I indicated that, if anything, Goldberg has had
an adverse effect legislatively in terms of securing the entitlement to
public assistance as a social right. Here, I want to emphasize its conceptual irrelevance.
The majority opinion in Goldberg heavily relies on a seminal law
review article, which analogized modern forms of governmental largess, such as licensing and public benefit entitlements, to traditional
concepts of property.1 0 0 A government benefit is, however, not the
same thing as owning a piece of real property or even a copyright.
Traditional property interests are civil rights. They establish protected
areas of activity, where individuals are free to initiate action and make
claims often in spite of, rather than with the support of the state. In
contrast, entitlement to public assistance requires governmental action in the very establishment of the claim. This means that the financial and ideological stakes in promoting social rights are very different
from those concerning civil rights. Their establishment requires substantial public expenditures and a broadly shared recognition of
human worth, which transcends the differential impact of societal
conditions on individual opportunities and aspirations.
As a result of deft legal reasoning by analogy, Goldberg became a
landmark procedural rights case. Intellectually, it fits comfortably
within the American legal tradition of protecting property interests
and extending procedural safeguards. The decision, however,
98.
(1954).
99.

100.

See ALEXIS

DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA,

VOI. 11, Second Book, ch. V

See EHRENBERG, supra note 95, at ix, xv.

See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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portends little for the eventual constitutional recognition and cultural
acceptance of social rights.
It is highly unlikely that legal argumentation alone ever can carry
the day politically on an issue as novel and weighty as the constitutionalization of social rights. The path by which ideas become deeply engrained and are sufficiently compelling to shape cultural perceptions
and affect actual social change is far too contingent and circuitous.
For new constitutional concepts to take root practically, there needs
to be much more pre-existing and pervasive institutional and structural support than Denvir acknowledges. While we emphasize greatly
individual rights, we have, at best, only an inchoate conception of social rights. It would have been especially enlightening had Denvir directly confronted and comprehensively considered the reasons for the
historical and political under-development of social rights in the
United States. The circumscribing conditions that he does address,
mainly as part of his discussion of political rights, only scratch the
surface.
B.

Happiness As a State Constitutional Right

While the notion of social rights does not have much historical
currency in the American constitutional tradition, this is not the case
with respect to the idea of happiness as a political ideal. Not only is
the pursuit of happiness one of the fundamental rights famously pronounced in the Declaration of Independence, it also appears as a provision in two-thirds of all state constitutions. This widespread state
constitutional recognition of the pursuit of happiness, as reported in a
recent survey undertaken by former California Supreme Court Associate Justice Joseph R. Grodin, is often in conjunction with the promise
of a right to safety as well as a declaration to actually "obtain" it.10 1
The California constitutional formulation is typical. It states: "All
people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."' 10 2 "Privacy" as an explicit right
was added by referendum to the California Constitution in November
1972.103 The language regarding "pursuing and obtaining safety and
happiness" dates back to the initial California Constitution of 1849,
101. See Joseph R. Grodin, Rediscovering the State Constitutional Right to Happiness and
Safety, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1997).
102. CAL. CONST., art. I, § 1.
103. See CAL. CONST., art. I, § 1 (West 1983).
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and it replicates language found in the Virginia and Pennsylvania Declarations of Rights of 1776, both of which were adopted at state constitutional conventions shortly before the signing of the Declaration of
104

Independence.

In considering the philosophical underpinnings to happiness as a
political idea in the 18th and 19th centuries, Grodin discusses both
classical and enlightenment strands. 10 5 He attributes to the founders,
in particular, a solid familiarity with such knowledge, whether they
were formally schooled or tutored at home. Classically, from Aristotle,
the key term is "eudaimonia," which is translated as "happiness" or
"flourishing."10 6 Our contemporary ear does not always hear happiness as meaning flourishment, but it is the latter denotation that best
captures the sociological significance of the concept. It signifies both
a quest for human perfection and a communal goal. The virtuous life
involves striving to fulfill one's true nature, and an essential societal
function is to help individuals fully realize their special talents.
It is this sense of happiness, personally and politically, that
prompts Denvir's reliance on the Declaration of Independence as a
constitutional starting point for his vision of democratic individualism.
What he does not explore is the state constitutional historical legacy
and potential contemporary relevance of happiness as a fundamental
right. Because these state constitutional provisions have not been extensively interpreted, they provide a relatively unencumbered legal
framework for developing new constitutional thought. What this
would mean for the role of government, however, is not clear.
The difficulty originates in enlightenment political theory, which
was divided as to what the idea of happiness implied for good government. As Grodin points out, a prominent figure like John Locke emphasized the negative rights-the immunities-that individuals had
against government. 0 7 Locke's political thought is not supportive of
an expansive role for government in promoting the happiness of individuals. This is in contrast to the views of the 18th century Swiss writer
Jean Jacques Burlamaqui-a much lesser known political theorist today but not then-who stressed the affirmative obligations of govern104. See GRODIN supra note 101, at 5-7. According to Grodin, historical accounts credit
the happiness and safety language in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which was generated first, to George Mason, who later as a leading anti-federalist refused to endorse the
Federal Constitution of 1787 because it gave too much power to the federal government
and lacked a statement of rights. See id at 8-10.
105. See GRODIN, supra note 100, at 8-19.
106. Id. at 11.
107. See id. at 15.
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ment to increase the happiness of its citizenry. 0 8 Grodin frames the
difference in this way: "In modern terms, Locke's perspective is more
libertarian, Burlamaqui's more communitarian." 0 9 That one accepts
the pursuit of happiness as an overarching constitutional ideal does
not resolve the political or constitutional dilemma regarding what is
properly within the public domain of government and what is best left
to the interactions of private individuals and organizations in societyat-large.
Grodin found the judicial record of interpreting state constitutional provisions regarding the right to happiness typically shallow
and unimaginative. 10 Some state courts have treated this type of provision as merely hortatory-a direction to the legislature-and not judicially enforceable. "I Other state courts have considered whether
such a right limits the ability of the state to regulate alcohol consumption or the use of drugs, or even engage in professional licensing or
other forms of economic regulation. 112 Only a few state courts have
ventured forward to discuss whether provisions regarding the pursuit
of happiness or the rights of happiness and safety establish affirmative
governmental social welfare obligations. 1 3 In short, the existing court
cases are neither especially illuminating nor definitive.
The point is that the historical and continuing existence in state
constitutions of provisions guaranteeing happiness as a fundamental
right provides an additional intellectual opening for considering in
the American political cultural context any ambitions regarding the
eventual constitutional recognition of social rights. Denvir makes this
link generally at the beginning of his book, but he never specifically
addresses the state constitutional prospects either as a direction to the
legislature and a catalyst for popular action or as affirmative rights
directly enforceable judicially. The Privileges or Immunities Clause is
not the only largely forgotten textual source to be resurrected in support of the constitutionalization of social rights.
There is nothing certain about the course of ideas as steps on the
path toward meaningful social and political reforms. Ideas with deep
cultural resonance, however, tend to have the most significant practical impact because they touch a common-sense nerve with leaders and
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id.
Id.
See id. at
See id, at
See id. at
See id. at

19-33.
19-22.
22-28.
29-33.
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the general citizenry alike. In Democracy's Constitution,Denvir makes an
important innovative contribution toward shifting the constitutional
dialogue. It is now incumbent on him and the rest of us to tap further
into our collective intellectual heritage.
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